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Abstract
This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the efficiency performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the
performance of a proposed mechanism. The analysis highlights the importance
of considering strategic behavior when comparing different institutional systems.
We find that in concentrated markets, neither auction mechanism can guarantee
an efficient allocation. The advantage of the current mechanism increases with
increased price competition if market demand is perfectly inelastic. However, if
market demand has some responsiveness to price, the superiority of the current
auction with respect to efficiency is not that obvious. We present a case where
the proposed auction outperforms the current mechanism on efficiency even if all
offers reflect true production costs. We also find that a market designer might face
a choice problem with a tradeoff between lower electricity cost and production
efficiency. Some implications for social welfare are discussed as well.
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Introduction

A payment cost minimization (PCM) auction has been proposed to solve the
problem of inflated wholesale electricity prices. In the electricity industry,
where even small changes in $/MW are worth tens of millions of dollars, it
is highly important that policy makers have a good understanding of the
tradeoffs and impacts of new institutional rules. In this paper we examine
efficiency performance of the proposed PCM auction in contrast with the
offer cost minimization (OCM) auction currently used by most independent
system operators (ISOs) in the United States. For most of the analysis we
concentrate on production efficiency, which is attained when a product is
supplied to the market by the suppliers that have the smallest average total
cost (ATC). An electricity market is efficient if there is no generator that
could produce electricity cheaper than the chosen generators do. Production
efficiency is desired because 1) it guarantees that market output is produced
using the least-cost combination of inputs, thus resources are not wasted, 2)
it also rewards the low-cost suppliers and provides the incentives to search
for production techniques with even lower costs.
Deregulated U.S. wholesale electricity markets (e.g. the day-ahead, hourahead, and real-time markets) operated by ISOs generally adopt an auction
mechanism to select generation offers and demand bids for energy and ancillary services. In the day-ahead energy markets, all selected suppliers are
paid at a uniform market clearing price (MCP), usually the price of the most
expensive selected offer. Currently, most ISOs adopt the OCM auction by
using the traditional unit commitment approach.2 It has been pointed out
by Yan and Stern (2002) that this auction does not ensure the lowest procurement costs of electricity to consumers for a given set of offers. This
motivated Luh et al. (2005a) to develop a market clearing algorithm that
minimizes actual procurement costs. They showed that the new method
is viable, and can lead to significant savings for consumers for the given
set of offers since it considers the impact of MCPs on total payment costs
while OCM does not. Knoblauch (2005) pointed out that if suppliers tailor
their offers to the type of auction they face, it is no longer obvious that the
PCM algorithm will generate lower procurement costs. A game theoretic
approach was used to analyze how the new auction affects market participant behaviors. The results demonstrated that adding competing suppliers
increases the advantage of the new method over the traditional with respect
to procurement costs even when strategic behavior is taken into account.
2

For a bibliographical survey on the unit commitment problem see Padhy (2004).
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Proponents of the OCM auction claim that if offer prices represent true
production costs, then this mechanism maximizes total producer and consumer surplus, or in other words, achieves allocative efficiency (Arroyo and
Conejo (2002), Alonso et al. (1999)). However, the 2000-01 California energy
crisis shows us that offers frequently have nothing to do with the actual cost
of generation units and can vary greatly even among units with similar costs
(Stern, 2001). In our attempt to capture strategic behavior of market participants, we use a game theoretic approach to investigate production efficiency
performance of two auctions. Following the above mentioned studies, we assume that market demand is given, i.e. perfectly inelastic, and therefore
demand bids are not considered for the most of the paper. This assumption
implies that our production efficiency analysis is equivalent to the allocative
efficiency analysis. With that said, if market demand is not perfectly inelastic, this generalization can not be made. However, at the end of this paper,
we look at allocative efficiency performance of two auctions with downward
sloping market demand curve as well.
In the day-ahead energy markets, all generating units submit their offers
for every hour. Offer information includes a set of energy blocks and their
corresponding prices. A generator may also declare technical constraints and
a start-up price, which is paid to the generator if the offer is selected. The
later feature of offers distinguishes wholesale electricity auctions from other
quantity-price bid auctions. Therefore, it is critical to evaluate allocative
efficiency properties of the OCM and the PCM algorithms in the context
of electricity market design. We demonstrate in this paper that the OCM
approach does not necessarily lead to the maximum of total surplus for
market participants. This is true even if offer prices reflect true production
costs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a
motivating example from Yan and Stern (2002) is used to demonstrate the
difference between the OCM and the PCM auctions and to stress the need
to consider strategic behavior as we compare the two. In Section 3, using Knoblauch’s (2005) game theoretic model, we present a surprising case
where the OCM outcome is less efficient than the PCM one if strategic behavior is taken into account. Section 4 demonstrates that in a simple TwoSupplier Auction Model, which better describes more concentrated markets,
both formulations can generate production inefficient outcomes. Competition impacts on production efficiency are analyzed in Section 5. The results
suggest that as competition in the market increases, a market designer will
likely face a tradeoff between two objectives: to minimize procurement cost
of electricity and to seek production efficient allocations. In Section 6, Yan
3

Unit
Unit
Unit
Unit

A
B
C
D

Table 1: Costs and Characteristics of Four Units
Capacity (MW) Energy Price ($/MW) Start-up Cost ($)
45
10
0
45
20
0
50
100
20
80
30
2,000

and Stern’s example is extended to include the demand side of the market.
We show the case where the PCM auction outperforms the OCM auction on
allocative efficiency even if offer prices reflect true production costs. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.

2

Electricity Auction with Strategic Behavior. Example 1

In this section, a simple example from Yan and Stern (2002) is used to
highlight the differences between the OCM and the PCM.3 The authors take
offers as given and do not account that generators might tailor their offers to
the type of auction they face. We demonstrate how the outcomes from the
auctions might change if strategic behavior is considered. Assume a power
system for one hour with four units and perfectly inelastic system demand
of 100MW. The costs and characteristics of the four units are summarized
in Table 1.
Let’s say for now that all generators submit offers that reflect their true
production costs. The OCM algorithm selects offers so as to minimize total offered cost calculated from submitted energy prices and start-up costs.
However, all suppliers are paid the MCP, i.e. the highest accepted energy
price, for their supplied electricity. The PCM algorithm assigns contracts
in order to minimize the actual final payment which is based on the MCP.
It is important to note that in both auctions, actual payment is made at
MCP. The solutions for the OCM and the PCM formulations are provided
respectively in Tables 2 and 3.
These two methods produce different unit schedules with a significant
impact on cost. The OCM contract allocation results in a $100.2/MW final
price to consumers and a $23.7/MW average generation cost; the PCM results in $50/MW and $36.5/MW respectively. This example suggests that
there might be a tradeoff between lower procurement costs of electricity and
3

For mathematical formulation of two auctions see Luh et al. (2005a).
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Table 2: Optimal Solution for the OCM Auction

Unit A
Unit B
Unit C
Unit D
Total

Energy
Schedule
(MW)
45
45
10
0
100

Unit Commitment
Energy
Start-up
Cost
Cost
($)
($)
450
0
900
0
1,000
20
0
0
2,350
20

SubTotal
($)
450
900
1,020
0
2,370

Pay the MCP=$100/MW
Energy Start-up
SubCost
Cost
Total
($)
($)
($)
4,500
0
4,500
4,500
0
4,500
1,000
20
1,020
0
0
0
10,000
20
10,020

Table 3: Optimal Solution for the PCM Auction

Unit A
Unit B
Unit C
Unit D
Total

Energy
Schedule
(MW)
45
45
0
10
100

Unit Commitment
Energy
Start-up
Cost
Cost
($)
($)
450
0
900
0
0
0
300
2,000
1,650
2,000

SubTotal
($)
450
900
0
2,300
3,650

Pay the MCP=$30/MW
Energy Start-up
SubCost
Cost
Total
($)
($)
($)
1,350
0
1,350
1,350
0
1,350
0
0
0
300
2,000
2,300
3,000
2,000
5,000

production efficiency. However, a question here is whether the offer strategies to bid true generation costs correspond to Nash equilibria. Can any
supplier benefit from changing their offer strategies unilaterally? Generators could restrict their generation output, change the energy cost and/or
start-up cost. ISOs usually demand an explanation if generators change
their start-up costs or generation capacity, so strategic behavior is somewhat limited in these activities. Therefore, in this paper, we consider only
energy cost offer strategies.
Assume that market participants have perfect information about electricity production costs in the various types of generator units. In both
auctions, A and B sell their full capacity and earn profit since the MCP
price is higher than their energy cost. They cannot benefit from changing
their offers. By doing so, they might risk some or all of their profits. D is a
marginal generator in the PCM allocation and earns no economic profit. D
could offer higher energy cost and still be selected for 10MW of generation.
It is in the interest of D to slightly underbid the total payment of $10,020
when C is selected. If D offers $80/MW, the total payment is $10,000
(< $10, 020) and its economic profit is $500. C cannot benefit by changing
its offer, since bidding below its costs would result in economic loss. On the
other hand, C is a marginal generator with zero economic profit in the OCM
allocation. It is in the interest of C to slightly underbid the total offer cost

5

of $3,650 when D is selected. If C offers $227/MW, the total offer cost is
$3,640 (< $3, 650) and its economic profit is $1,250. D cannot improve its
payoff in this case. Note that the final payment to consumers amounts to
$22,720. Do these new sets of offer strategies correspond to Nash equilibria?
The answer is closer to yes.
In this particular example, the cost impact of two auctions is even higher
if we account for strategic behavior. The OCM contract allocation results in
a $227.2/MW final price to consumers and a $23.7/MW average generation
cost; the PCM results in $100/MW and $36.5/MW respectively. In this
case, switching from the OCM to the PCM auction would cause an increase
of $12.8/MW in average production costs and a reduction of $127/MW in
consumer price of electricity. It has to be noted that consumer savings here
are at the expense of smaller generator profits and an increase in average
production costs are at the expense of allocative efficiency. This paper explores a tradeoff between lower procurement costs and production efficiency
again later. In Section 6, we extend this example by including demand bids
and demonstrate that lower consumer prices from PCM does not necessarily
lead to a loss in allocative efficiency.
This simple example underscores the importance of considering strategic
behavior when evaluating the performance of different power market institutions. It also suggests that market supervisors should keep a sharp eye
on the marginal generators if market behavior becomes a concern. In the
next section, we present a surprising case where the OCM outcome is less
production efficient than the PCM if strategic behavior is taken into account.

3

Can an OCM Allocation Be Less Production Efficient than a PCM? Example 2

In a one-person game, Knoblauch (2005) shows that, counterintuitively, the
PCM generates higher procurement costs than the OCM. We present a similarly surprising case where the OCM is less production efficient than the
PCM. One would expect low-cost generators to underbid high-cost generators in order to be selected by the OCM auction. Especially because highcost suppliers would most likely be setting the MCP and economic profits
would be earned.
Consider an electricity market for one hour with two generators. Supplier
1 has start-up cost zero and energy cost $25/MW. He can supply 0, 1 or 2
MW of energy. Supplier 1 has two strategies, offer low Ol (1) = Ol (2) = $25
and offer high Oh (1) = Oh (2) = $40. Supplier 2 has start-up cost $20 and
6

energy cost $10/MW. She can supply 1MW of energy and always submits
her true generation cost structure. The demand is inelastic and equal to
2MW. Notice that Supplier 1 has lower average total cost than Supplier 2,
therefore he is relatively more efficient. An allocation of contracts would be
production inefficient if Supplier 2 generated electricity while Supplier 1 was
idle.
Game 1: The OCM Auction
The ISO calculates the minimum of the offered cost of buying 1MW from
each supplier and the offered cost of buying 2MW from Supplier 1.
If Supplier 1 submits Ol , the ISO calculates offered cost as
Min{20+10+25, 2(25)}=2(25)=50 and Supplier 1’s payoff is 50-2*25=0.
If Supplier 1 submits Oh , the ISO calculates offered cost as
Min{20+10+40, 2(40)}= 20+10+40=70 and Supplier 1’s payoff is 40-25=15.
Therefore, in equilibrium Supplier 1 offers high, the MCP is $40/MW
and the actual procurement cost is $100. Notice, that this allocation is not
production efficient, since Supplier 2, with relatively higher average total
cost, is serving 1MW, while Supplier 1, with relatively lower average total
cost, is idle.
Game 2: The PCM Auction
The ISO calculates the minimum of the procurement cost of buying 1MW
from each supplier and the procurement cost of buying 2MW from Supplier
1.
If Supplier 1 submits Ol , the ISO calculates procurement cost as
Min{20+2max{10,25}, 2(25)}=2(25)=50 and Supplier 1’s payoff is 50-2*25=0.
If Supplier 1 submits Oh , the ISO calculates procurement cost as
Min{20+2max{10,40}, 2(40)}=2(40)=80 and Supplier 1’s payoff is 80-2*25=30.
Therefore, in equilibrium Supplier 1 offers high, the MCP is $40/MW
and the actual procurement cost is $80. Notice that this allocation is production efficient, since there is no way to serve 2MW cheaper than the chosen
supplier does.
In this case, the OCM generates both less efficient allocation and higher
procurement costs than the PCM. In both auctions Supplier 1 offers high.
This implies that neither auction can guarantee to eliminate strategic market
behavior. Supplier 1 could underbid Supplier 2 in the OCM auction to
capture the whole market, but it appears that it is more profitable to sell
less at a high price rather than more at a low price. In Section 4, it will be
shown that both auctions can generate production inefficient outcomes in
7

small and concentrated markets. When a competitor for Supplier 1 is added
to the market, no analog of the discussed case exists.

4

Simple Two-Supplier Auctions

To see if Example 2 is typical, we adopt Knoblauch’s (2005) game theoretic
approach and investigate the simplest two-supplier auctions. We examine
games which are identical to Games 1 and 2.
Consider an electricity market for one hour. The demand is inelastic and
equal to 2MW. Supplier 1 has zero start-up costs and energy cost L1 > 0.
He can supply 0, 1 or 2MW of energy. Supplier 1 can offer low Ol (1) =
Ol (2) = L or offer high Oh (1) = Oh (2) = H. Supplier 2 has start-up cost S
and energy cost A > 0. She can supply 1MW of energy and always submits
her true generation cost structure. Supplier 1’s offer has to be at least L1 ,
i.e. , otherwise Supplier 1 will not cover his generation costs.
To evaluate production efficiency we need to look at five cost structure
cases.4
Case 1: S + A < L1 (i.e. AT C2 < AT C1 )
This is the case in which Supplier 2 is relatively more efficient than
Supplier 1. Since L1 ≤ L < H, it follows that S + A < L. This is equivalent
to Case 1 in Knoblauch (2005, section 3).
Game 3: The OCM Auction
Ol : min{S + A + L, 2L} = S + A + L
π1 = L − L1
Oh : min{S + A + H, 2H} = S + A + H
π1 = H − L1
Since L−L1 < H −L1 , Supplier 1 offers high, procurement cost is S +2H
and allocation is efficient.
Game 4: The PCM Auction
Ol : min{S + 2max{A, L}, 2L} = 2L
π1 = 2(L − L1 )
Oh : min{S + 2max{A, H}, 2H} = 2H
π1 = 2(H − L1 )
Since 2(L − L1 ) < 2(H − L1 ), Supplier 1 offers high, procurement cost
is 2H and allocation is inefficient.
The OCM picks 1MW from each supplier, and the PCM picks 2MW
from Supplier 1. The PCM allocation is not production efficient, since Supplier 2 could produce electricity cheaper than the chosen Supplier 1 does
(S + A < L1 ). The OCM allocation is production efficient, since there is no
way to produce electricity cheaper than the chosen suppliers do (production
4

The less likely knife-edge cases such as S + A = L have been omitted.
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cost = S + A + L1 ).
In the following 4 cases Supplier 1 is relatively more efficient than Supplier 2 (i.e. AT C1 < AT C2 ).
Case 2: L1 < S + A < L < H
Since S + A < L , similarly to Case 1, the OCM picks 1MW from each
supplier and the PCM picks 2MW from Supplier 1. The OCM allocation is
not production efficient, since Supplier 1 could produce 1MW cheaper than
the chosen Supplier 2 does (L1 < S +A). The PCM allocation is production
efficient, since there is no way to produce electricity cheaper than the chosen
supplier does (2L1 ). Procurement cost is S + 2H in the OCM auction and
2H in the PCM auction.
Case 3: L1 < L < S + A < H and 2L − H < L1
Game 3: The OCM Auction
Ol : min{S + A + L, 2L} = 2L
π1 = 2(L − L1 )
Oh : min{S + A + H, 2H} = S + A + H
π1 = H − L1
Since 2(L − L1 ) < H − L1 , Supplier 1 offers high, procurement cost is
S + 2H and allocation is inefficient.
Game 4: The PCM Auction
Ol : min{S + 2max{A, L}, 2L} = 2L
π1 = 2(L − L1 )
Oh : min{S + 2max{A, H}, 2H} = 2H
π1 = 2(H − L1 )
Since 2(L − L1 ) < 2(H − L1 ), Supplier 1 offers high, procurement cost
is 2H and allocation is efficient.
The OCM picks 1MW from each supplier and the PCM picks 2MW from
Supplier 1. The OCM allocation is not production efficient, since Supplier
2, with relatively higher average total cost, is serving 1MW, while Supplier
1, with relatively lower average total cost (L1 < S + A), is idle. The PCM
allocation is production efficient, since there is no way to produce electricity
cheaper than the chosen supplier does (2L1 ).
Case 4: L1 < L < S + A < H and 2L − H > L1
Game 3: The OCM Auction
Ol : min{S + A + L, 2L} = 2L
π1 = 2(L − L1 )
Oh : min{S + A + H, 2H} = S + A + H
π1 = H − L1
Since 2(L − L1 ) > H − L1 , Supplier 1 offers low, procurement cost is 2L
and allocation is efficient.
Game 4: The PCM Auction
Ol : min{S + 2max{A, L}, 2L} = 2L
π1 = 2(L − L1 )
9

Table 4: The Outcomes of the OCM and the PCM Auctions
Auction
OCM
PCM

Case 1
$
Eff.
S + 2H
Yes
2H
No

Case 2
$
Eff.
S + 2H
No
2H
Yes

Case 3
$
Eff.
S + 2H
No
2H
Yes

Case 4
$
Eff.
2L
Yes
2H
Yes

Case 5
$
Eff.
2H
Yes
2H
Yes

Oh : min{S + 2max{A, H}, 2H} = 2H
π1 = 2(H − L1 )
Since 2(L − L1 ) < 2(H − L1 ), Supplier 1 offers high, procurement cost
is 2H and allocation is efficient.
Both auctions pick 2MW from Supplier 1. Both the OCM allocation
and the PCM allocation are production efficient, since there is no way to
produce electricity cheaper than the chosen supplier does (2L1 ).
Case 5: L1 < L < H < S + A
Since H < S + A , both auctions pick 2MW from Supplier 1. Both the
OCM allocation and the PCM allocation are production efficient. Procurement cost is 2H in both auctions.
The outcomes of the OCM and the PCM auctions are summarized in
Table 4.
In summary, if we consider Cases 1-5, which were constructed using Example 2 as a template, sometimes the PCM is less efficient and sometimes
the OCM is less efficient. This indicates that in small, concentrated and
simple markets, neither algorithm could guarantee production efficient allocations if strategic behavior takes place. The results hold even if we allow
energy price offers to be increasing or decreasing step functions of electricity
quantity, or if we let the strategy sets for energy prices to be continuous.
In Section 5, we show that when another competitor of Supplier 1 type is
introduced, there are no cases in which the OCM generates less production
efficient allocations than the PCM. This suggests that in a market with
completely inelastic demand, an increase in competition will likely lead to
an advantage of the OCM auction over the PCM auction with respect to
efficiency.

5

An Added Competitor

To see how competition impacts the efficiency of the OCM and the PCM
auctions, we extend our analysis from a two supplier market to a wholesale
electricity market with three suppliers. An added competitor is identical to
Supplier 1. We call these twin suppliers without start-up costs Supplier 1a
10

and Supplier 1b. We refer to the supplier with start-up costs as Supplier
2. The suppliers of type 1 have a continuum of strategies. They can offer
energy price p $/MW, where p is real. The demand for 2MW is inelastic,
however, there is a maximum willingness to pay of N $/MW, where N > L1 .
Knoblauch (Proposition 1, 2005) proves that, in the unique Nash equilibrium, Supplier 1a and Supplier 1b will submit the offers that reflect their
true energy generation cost (L1 ). This result makes our analysis simpler
than in the two-supplier auctions.
To evaluate efficiency we need to look at two cost structure cases.
Case I: (i.e. AT C2 < AT C1 )
In this case, Supplier 2 is relatively more efficient than Supplier 1a and
Supplier 1b. The OCM auction picks 1MW from Supplier 2, MW from
Supplier 1a and MW from Supplier 1b. The PCM auction picks 1MW from
Supplier 1a and 1MW from Supplier 1b. The PCM allocation is not production efficient, since Supplier 2 could produce 1MW cheaper than the chosen
suppliers do (S +A < L1 ). The OCM allocation is production efficient, since
there is no way to produce electricity cheaper than the chosen suppliers do
(production cost = S + A + L1 ). Procurement cost is S + 2L1 in the OCM
auction and 2L1 in the PCM auction.
Case II: (i.e. AT C1 < AT C2 )
In this case, Suppliers 1a and 1b are relatively more efficient than Supplier 2. Both auctions pick 1MW from Supplier 1a and 1MW from Supplier
1b. Both allocations are production efficient. Procurement cost is 2L1 in
both auctions.
In summary, if AT C2 < AT C1 , then the OCM auction is more efficient;
and if AT C1 < AT C2 , then both auctions generate equally efficient allocations of contracts. In other words, when Supplier 1 has a competitor, there
is no analog to Example 2; the OCM auction outperforms the PCM auction
with respect to efficiency.
In Case II, both auctions achieve the same procurement cost and efficiency. In Case I, the OCM attains a more efficient allocation and the
PCM produces a lower procurement cost to consumers. This suggests that
as competition in the market increases, a market designer will likely face a
tradeoff between two objectives: to minimize procurement cost of electricity
or to seek production efficient allocations. Up to this point we assumed that
market demand is given, i.e. perfectly inelastic. This implies that our production efficiency analysis is equivalent to the allocative efficiency analysis.
11

Therefore, those who use allocative efficiency as a measure for social welfare
would argue that competitive markets should favor the OCM auction over
the PCM. We address this issue in more detail in the next section.

6

Can the PCM Outperform the OCM on Allocative Efficiency if Offer Prices Reflect True Production Costs? Example 3

In the previous sections we argued that if strategic behavior takes place then
both auctions might produce inefficient production allocations. It has been
shown that an increase in competition will likely lead to an advantage of
the OCM over the PCM with respect to production efficiency and allocative efficiency if the market demand is perfectly inelastic. In the partial
equilibrium analysis, as opposed to general equilibrium analysis, allocative
efficiency is a measure of total surplus, a sum of producer and consumer
surpluses. Sometimes it is used as a proxy for social welfare (Arroyo and
Conejo (2002), Alonso et al. (1999)). Proponents of the OCM see this as a
strong argument for their case. In this section, we consider demand bids for
electricity and reexamine the claim that in competitive markets the OCM
auction outperforms the PCM auction on allocative efficiency.
This analysis is different from other allocative efficiency investigations
of auctions because electricity suppliers submit not only energy price offer
curves, but also start-up costs which are reimbursed to generators if their
offers are selected. If all suppliers are paid a uniform market clearing price,
then the funds to pay for their start-up costs must be obtained from consumers by charging them a higher price than what generators receive.
Recall a power system from Example 1 in Section 2. The costs and
characteristics of the four units are summarized in Table 1. Five demand
bids are summarized in Table 5. Market demand and supply is depicted in
Figure 1 .
Assume for now that the market is competitive, all generators submit
offers that reflect their true production costs and all consumers submit bids
that reflect their true values. Example 1 demonstrated that the OCM auction would sell 100MW for $10,020. However, if all consumers are paying
a uniform price, they would pay at most $10,000 for 100MW. Therefore,
the OCM auction is able to sell only 95MW for $9,520. So, consumers pay
$100.21/MW and the average generation cost is $19.68/MW. In this case,
the total surplus is (160*60+140*35)-(10*45+20*45+100*5+20)=$12,630.
Recall that the PCM auction sells 100MW for $5,000, which is less
12

Table 5: Values and Demand Quantities of Five Consumers
Consumer Demand (MW) Value ($/MW)
U
60
160
X
35
140
Y
5
100
Z
40
90
W
30
20

Figure 1: Market Demand and Supply
than what consumers are willing to pay. Moreover, the PCM auction sells
140MW for $6,200, which is also less than what consumers would pay
($12,600). Therefore, the auction allocates 140MW for $44.29/MW. The average generation cost is $34.64/MW. In this case, the total surplus amounts
to (160*60+140*35+100*5+90*40)-(10*45+20*45+30*50+2,000)=$13,750.
This example demonstrates that the PCM can outperform the OCM on
allocative efficiency even if production prices reflect true production costs.
Next we can ask the same question as in Section 2: ”Do the offer strategies to bid true generation costs correspond to Nash equilibria?”
Assume that market participants have perfect information about electricity production costs in the various types of generator units and about
electricity benefits to consumers. In both auctions, A and B sell their full
13

capacity and earn profit since MCP price is higher than their energy cost.
They cannot benefit from changing their offers. By doing so, they might risk
some or all of their profits. D is a marginal generator in the PCM allocation
and earns no economic profit. D could offer higher energy cost and still be
selected for 50MW of generation. It is in the interest of D to bid as close
as possible to $12,600, the amount that consumers are willing to pay for
140MW. If D offers $75/MW, the total payment is $12,500 (< $12, 600) and
its economic profit is $2,250. C cannot benefit by changing its offer, since
bidding below its costs would result in economic loss. On the other hand,
C is a marginal generator with zero economic profit in the OCM allocation.
It is in the interest of C to bid as close as possible to $13,300, the amount
that consumers are willing to pay for 95MW. If C offers $139/MW, the total
payment is $13,225 (< $13, 300) and C’s economic profit is $195. D cannot
improve its payoff in this case.
To sum it up, the OCM contract allocation results in a $139.21/MW
final price to consumers and a $19.68/MW average generation cost; the
PCM results in a $89.29/MW and a $34.64/MW respectively. In this case,
switching from the OCM to the PCM auction would lead to an increase of
$14.96/MW in average production costs and a reduction of $49.92/MW in
the consumer price of electricity. However, in this case consumer savings
and higher production costs under the PCM auction are not in expense of
allocative efficiency. On the contrary, the PCM outperforms the OCM on
allocative efficiency.
One could argue that consumers might bid strategically as well. In that
case, electricity prices might be lower than those discussed above, when
only suppliers act strategically. However, qualitative results on allocative
efficiency would persist.
It is not the intention of this paper to state that the PCM auction would
always outperform the OCM auction on allocative efficiency if implemented
in practice. To answer that question, empirical investigation for the specific
wholesale power market has to be done. But it is clear from the example
that a proper algorithm for electricity allocation should take into account
the total consumer payment and whether consumers are willing to pay that
much (e.g. Luh et al. (2005b)), if indeed market demand has at least some
responsiveness to electricity price.
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Conclusions

It has been shown that the proposed payment cost minimization auction can
significantly reduce inflated wholesale electricity prices. Critics claim that
the auction is inefficient and that it would compromise social welfare in a
competitive market. The goal of this paper was to investigate the efficiency
performance of the current OCM auction versus the proposed PCM auction.
The importance of considering strategic behavior in the analysis of deregulated electricity market was emphasized multiple times. We employed game
theoretic approach that allowed for strategic behavior by suppliers. An example was presented in which, counterintuitively, the OCM auction generated less production efficient allocation of contracts than the PCM auction.
It was shown that neither formulation can guarantee production efficient
outcomes in small and concentrated markets. Next, we showed that as
competition increases, the production efficiency performance of the current
mechanism versus the proposed auction improves. The results suggest that
a market designer might face a tradeoff between lower procurement cost of
electricity and production efficiency. Advice for market supervisors would
be to keep a sharp eye on the marginal generators if market behavior becomes a concern. Finally, it was demonstrated that the PCM auction can
outperform the OCM auction on allocative efficiency even if offers reflect
true generation costs. If indeed market demand is not perfectly inelastic,
an allocation algorithm that maximizes total surplus should account for the
total consumer payment and check whether consumers are willing to pay
that much. It is important to remember that the use of allocative efficiency
as a measure for social welfare is limited to partial equilibrium analysis as
opposed to general equilibrium analysis.
It should be noted that the total value of energy dispatched in these
systems is tens of billions of dollars annually. Even a small change in the
efficiency of market clearing algorithm is worth tens of millions of dollars.
Further empirical research should be done to evaluate potential gains from
switching to the new auction in the markets that are considering a change.
It was not the purpose of this paper to quantify the gains, but rather to
highlight the efficiency enhancing potential of the PCM auction.
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